"How al-Qaeda, Boko Haram smuggle arms into Nigeria"

 

"How al-Qaeda, Boko Haram smuggle arms into Nigeria"

http://www.osundefender.org/?p=100537

 

 

 

 

A picture taken from a video distributed to journalists in recent days

through intermediaries and obtained by AFP on March 5, 2013 reportedly shows

Abubakar Shekau (C), the suspected leader of Nigerian Islamist extremist

group Boko Haram, flanked by six armed and hooded fighters in an undisclosed

place.

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons is increasingly and

dangerously becoming a transnational organized crime in Nigeria with Boko

Haram's insurgency, re-emerging Niger Delta crisis and escalating

kidnapping, communal crises and armed robbery in the South East providing

impetus for arms trafficking. Some border towns, particularly in the North

Eastern flank, serve as a hub for trafficking of arms as well as stolen

goods, drugs and hostages by criminals, terrorists and their collaborators.

The recent kidnap of a French family at a border town between Nigeria and

Cameroon is an example. Similarly, many arms and ammunition of various

types, sizes and calibre have been intercepted and confiscated by security

agencies. The recurrent detection and recovery of cache of arms, ammunition

and Improvised Explosive Device Materials by the Joint Task Force, JTF,

further buttresses the point. Similarly, the occasional recovery of stolen

goods and hard drugs from criminals and terrorists' camps or hideouts is an

indication that the illicit trade has been on the rise in recent times.

 

Of concern is the discovery that despite the efforts of security agencies,

the "merchants of death" continue to engage in arms trafficking/ trading

through covert means largely aided and abetted by the porous nature of the

Nigerian borders with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Recently, the Comptroller

General of Nigerian Immigration Services stated that the Service had

discovered hundreds of illegal routes in Nigeria that link or lead to some

neighbouring African countries.

 

Nigeria's borders are massive with hundreds of footpaths crisscrossing to

neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger with links to Mali, Libya

and Sudan. From conservative estimate by locals, there are well over 250

footpaths from Damaturu/Maiduguri axis that link or lead direct to Cameroon,

Chad or Niger. These paths, which are mostly unknown to security agencies,

are unmanned, unprotected and have continued to serve as conveyor belts for

arms and ammunitions trafficking into Nigeria.

 

It is disheartening and unfortunate that the "merchants of death" have since

devised methods to beat security agencies at the borders, chief among them,

through the footpaths. These methods include the use of camels, donkeys and

cows to traffic arms, ammunition and drugs such as cocaine into Nigeria. The

fact that the weapons are small, light and collapsible makes it easy to be

concealed and moved on camels and donkeys' back in a specially crafted skin

or thatched bags mainly meant for the illegal "expedition" undetected.

Similarly, some cows and grains merchants in the North- East sub - region of

the country device means of hiding cache of arms and ammunition in empty

fuel tankers, vehicle engines and bags of grains.

 

The "grains" are transported in large number via trucks, trailers, lorries

and old model pickup vans and jeeps with little attention given to them by

security agents. The use of Jega type of tricycles ( KEKE-NAPEP) as well as

camels, donkeys, and cows (moving in flocks) to deceive, hide and

conveniently traffic arms in some parts of the North are ways hitherto

unknown, not well exposed or documented. Their capacity for arms trafficking

is beginning to be uncovered and is being curtailed by security agencies.

The security situation in the JTF Operation RESTORE ORDER area of

responsibility forced the task force to take on additional responsibility to

trace sources of arms and ammunition to Boko Haram insurgents, how the arms

are trafficked and are also taking measures to block them. This is one way

of effectively checkmating terrorism in Nigeria - destroy its centre of

gravity! And this seems to be a task that has so far proved difficult but

necessary to be accomplished if the war against insurgency is to be

effective and successful.

 

Similarly, the Libyan and Malian rebels are desperate to exchange arms for

money to Boko Haram terrorists, their financiers and collaborators as the

sect has since been affiliated to Al-Qaida in the Maghreb. This has added to

the overwhelming challenge of the influx of illegal aliens, arms,

ammunitions and sophisticated IED materials into the country and an

efficient and effective fight against terrorism. Additionally, the water

ways/ seaports provide havens for arms trafficking through ships and speed

boats on high seas and the use of canoes in the creeks. The exchange of

stolen crude oil for arms/ ammunition is a well known "trading activity"

nurtured and ferociously protected by militants or sea pirates and their

financiers and collaborators with the possible connivance of unscrupulous

law enforcement agents in the Niger Delta. This is one major source of arms

and ammunition that strengthens militants' arms and ammunition holding not

only in the Niger Delta but also in the South East and South Western parts

of the country.

 

Security agencies at the borders and seaports have severally complained of

the porosity of the nation's borders and waterways. The problem of porous

borders is compounded by inadequate personnel, patrol vehicles, surveillance

helicopters and equipment. Consequently, most of the borders are leaky and

this makes effective control of intruders, smugglers and "merchants of

death" a mirage. The vastness of the nation's borders in the face of these

challenges bring to the fore the need for a rethink on the management and

security of the Nigeria's borders and seaports - without which effective

fight against insurgency, arms trafficking and proliferation will remain an

optical illusion. There must be innovative technology; sound policies,

proficient process that will help protect our borders. It is worrisome that

the exact number of illegal routes and means through which illegal aliens,

arms and ammunition are trafficked into the country are largely unknown by

the nation's security system.

 

The use of innovative technology - radars and alarm systems- are major ways

developed countries utilize to monitor and secure their borders. Some radars

can be used as primary detection sensor for long range remote surveillance

platforms. The ability to detect slow moving targets, even in complex

mountainous, thickly forested terrains and large open areas make some radars

such us Blighter Radar ideal for remote surveillance and detection of

vehicles and people trying to cross borders illegally.

 

In remote areas, it is common for intruders to follow natural routes across

the land, valleys, mountain paths or animal tracks. In these instances,

Mobile Surveillance System provides a cost effective way of monitoring key

areas with limited resources. Similarly, Blighter Radar, unlike traditional

Air Surveillance Radar, can effectively survey both the land and low air

zone simultaneously.

 

Correspondingly, the fundamental problem of border security, arms

trafficking, efficient and effective fight against terrorism in Nigeria can

be linked to what Mr. Olusegun Adeniyi tersely identified as institutional

fragmentation, intelligence and policy non-coordination among the security

agencies. These challenges are real and must be addressed for the fight

against terrorism, arms proliferation and border security to be effective.

 

* Musa, a lieutenant colonel in Nigerian Army, is the spokesperson for

Operation Restore Order, Maiduguri, Borno State

 

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